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This paper develops a novel methodology, combining history of mathematics, philology,
philosophy of mathematics, and logic. We develop a formal logical treatment of Euclid’s
Elements, in which set theory plays no role, but the logic of part and whole does. We
ﬁrst consider a controversy about the nature of Euclid’s Elements Book II. For Euclid,
the part-whole relation plays roles that are now played by arithmetic operations. This
shows one crucial limitation of the controversial interpretation of this text as geometrical
algebra. Returning to the beginning, we present a formal language for stating Propositions
1 through 10 (omitting 7) and proofs of them. Surprisingly, this has never been done
(except for one recent approach, which differs from ours in an essential way). We conclude
by sketching several signiﬁcant ways in which this project can be further developed.
Geometry; extension; body; logic; mathematics; transformation.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the logic of continuous geometric objects and in particular
the use of the concepts of part andwhole in reasoning about those objects.We are pursuing
two interconnected goals. One is the interpretation of Euclid, and especially the interpre-
tation of his quantitative concepts and his use of the part-whole relation. The other is the
development of a logic of continuous objects that does not presuppose set theory. To begin
with, we sketch how these goals are connected.
The foundations of mathematics are usually conceived in set theoretic terms. Natural
numbers, integers, rational numbers, and real numbers are deﬁned in set theoretic terms.
Geometric objects are then introduced in terms of sets of n-tuples of real numbers (e.g.,
the unit-circle centered at the origin is the set of all points (x, y) in R × R that satisfy
x2 + y2 = 1, where R is the set of real numbers). Predicates such as three-dimensional or
continuous are also deﬁned in set theoretic terms. Surprisingly, there has not been much
investigation of the prospects for developing a formal logic of continuous objects that does
not presuppose set theory. Why would one want to do this? First, set theory is controver-
sial. Second, (normal versions of) set theory would seem to be a much more powerful
theory than one needs. Third, and most important, it is highly plausible that the theory
of continuous objects should not presuppose set theory and especially that the theory of
continuous objects should not treat points as primitive and objects as collections of points.
There is a long tradition, going back to Aristotle, of conceiving of points as derivative from
composite objects. At the very least, such theories should be developed and compared
with more familiar set-theory-based theories. Where in the history of philosophy and
mathematics can we ﬁnd such theories? Greek geometry is one of the most promising
sources of a theory of continuous objects that does not presuppose set theory. Thus one
promising approach to developing such a logic of continuous objects is to ﬂesh out (say)
Euclid’s geometric theory of continuous objects in the Elements into a full-ﬂedged formal
logic.
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The undertaking just described need not have anything much to do with under-
standing Euclid. But, properly carried out, it can. There are numerous logical gaps (by
our lights) in the Elements. Rather than ﬁlling those gaps in whatever way seems to us
best, one can try to ﬁll those gaps as Euclid would have. This is, of course, no trivial
undertaking. One major question that has arisen in recent discussion of the Elements is
whether, for Euclid, the diagrams play a role in justifying inferences. The question is not
whether the text Euclid wrote presupposes diagrams. Reviel Netz has argued decisively
that it does.1 But Netz’s arguments are entirely compatible with the diagrams playing a
merely ‘heuristic’ role, as an aid to the reader’s comprehension, rather than an inferential
role, justifying inferences from one sentence to another. Our reconstruction of Euclid’s
demonstrations will work on the assumption that the diagrams play no inferential role.
The question that we will try to illuminate is this: to what extent does Euclid rely on the
concepts of part and whole? In order to answer this question, we employ contemporary
formal logic as an interpretive tool.
In section 2, we develop further an interpretive problem concerning Euclid, namely
how to understand propositions 1 through 10 of Book II (the so-called ‘geometric al-
gebra’). This section provides a strong justiﬁcation for expecting the concepts of part and
whole to play a major role in Euclid’s reasoning – in particular, to play a role in connection
with quantitative reasoning. In section 3, we develop a logical language and give proofs for
the ﬁrst ten propositions of Book I (except for 7). Section 4 considers how this language
might be further developed or improved. Section 5 then explains the signiﬁcance of our
mereogeometry and sketches directions for further research.
2 Part and whole in Elements book II
Of recent controversy about the Elements, some of the most heated has focused on Book
II. This book is puzzling, because its ﬁrst 10 propositions are so straightforward that there
might seem to be no point in proving them. One prominent interpretation has explained
why Euclid would prove these theorems by characterizing them as geometric algebra. On
this interpretation, these propositions prove algebraic facts (such as the distributive law),
some fundamental, some more complicated and useful for solving quadratic equations.
Sabetai Unguru launched a polemical attack on this line of interpretation, arguing that
Book II is not algebraic at all, but rather geometric.2 Ken Saito has elaborated this line of
thought via an examination of how the propositions of Euclid II are used in Apollonius.3
He conceives Euclid II as a ‘toolbox’ for reasoning about invisible ﬁgures. It seems to
us that the parties to this controversy have overlooked the question of how precisely to
understand what Propositions 1 through 10 of Book II say and of how to compare those
propositions with their putative algebraic correlates. We think that careful attention to
the logic of these propositions provides essential illumination of their meaning, which
shows how they are not algebraic in character and also provides a necessary basis for Saito’s
analysis of their use.
The label ‘geometric algebra’ is highly problematic (as IanMueller noted in his critical
discussion of the whole line of interpretation).4 It has never, to my knowledge, been
satisfactorily elucidated, even by those who are ﬁercely critical of it. One aspect of the
thought, however, is fairly clear. It is that the propositions of Euclid II express the same
thing as is expressed by familiar algebraic equations. But this is obviously unsatisfactory
1 See Netz 1999, Chapter 1.
2 Unguru 1975.
3 Saito 1985.
4 Mueller 2006, 41–52.
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as an account of the meaning of any of the ﬁrst ten propositions of Euclid II. Consider
Proposition 4, for instance (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1 | Diagramm
It says, “If a straight line be cut arbitrarily, then the square on the whole is equal to the
squares on the segments and twice the rectangle contained by the segments.”5 If one
interprets the proposition as geometric algebra, then it says the same as (x + y)2 =
x2+2xy+y2. (We will call this algebraic statement ‘the binomial formula’). But Euclid’s
proposition is a proposition about squares and rectangles, i.e., about geometric ﬁgures.
While it corresponds to the binomial formula, the binomial formula does not say what
the proposition says. To establish this, it is enough to note that the proposition is about
squares and rectangles, not about real numbers. Of course, with that remark, we assume
that the binomial formula is an expression implicitly quantiﬁed over the real numbers
(For every x, y, such that x and y are real numbers, (x+y)2 = x2+2xy+y2). Not only is
Proposition II.4 not about (positive) real numbers, Euclid did not have the real numbers at
all, not even the positive ones. He has no term that corresponds to the term real number.
It has been argued that the Euclidean (or Eudoxan) concept of ratio, as deﬁned and used
in Book V, corresponds to the concept of a (positive) real number. Even if this were so
(and we deny it), the proposition in question occurs in Book II, long before the concept
of ratio is deﬁned or used.
The authors who have oppose the interpretation of Euclid in terms of geometric
algebraic also formulate the statement of II.4 as an equation (a statement involving the
sign ‘=’). They might write something like6:
If a line AB is divided at C, then sq AB = sq AC + sq CB +2 rect AC,CB.
5 The translation is my own.
6 Mueller 2006 does this, for instance, throughout the book.
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What does this mean? Well, ‘sq AB’ refers to the square that one could make on the line
segment AB. And ‘rect AC,CB’ refers to the rectangle that one could construct from the
line segments AC and CB as sides. There are complications about the meanings of these
expressions, but we will not explore those complications here. Rather, I would like to
focus on the signs ‘=’ and ‘+’.
Let us begin with ‘=’. In contemporary philosophy and mathematics, ‘=’ is normally
used as a sign for the identity relation. For instance, one might write, ‘For all x, x = x’
to say that every object is identical with itself or ‘For all x, x+ 1 = 1 + x’ to say that the
result of adding 1 to x is identical with the result of adding x to 1. Normally, statements
such as ‘2 + 2 = 4’ are taken to express identity – that is, the object named ‘4’ is identical
with the object that is the value of the addition-function for the arguments 2 and 2.
The identity relation is not, however, the relation of which Euclid speaks in II.4.
Euclid’s Greek is equipped to mark clearly the distinction between the identity relation
and the same-size-as relation. It is perhaps worth pausing for a moment to impress on
ourselves that these are in fact two distinct relations. The same-size-as relation is distinct
from the identity relation because there are things that are not identical, but are the same
size – your two hands, for instance. Of course, everything is the same size as itself (at any
given time), but many things are the same size as other things, i.e., as things with which
they are not identical. Now Euclid expresses the same-size-as relation in Greek by using
the expression ‘is equal to’, whereas he expresses the identity relation simply by using the
verb ‘to be’. The difference corresponds exactly to the difference between, say, ‘The square
on AB is equal to the square on BC’ (speaking of two distinct, equal squares), and ‘The
square on AB is the square on BC’ (speaking of a single square that has AB as one side and
BC as another, see Figs. 2 and 3).
Fig. 2 | Diagramm
Euclid’s Proposition II.4 clearly asserts that sq AB is equal to (not identical with) some-
thing. Thus it behooves not to use the standard sign for identity, ‘=’, but rather another
sign. We will use ‘≡’ to mean ‘is the same size as’.
Just as important, while many commentators use the sign ‘+’ between expressions of
the form ‘sq X’ or ‘rect X,Y’, none of them says anything about what it means. This is a
non-trivial matter. We would normally treat ‘+’ as referring to the addition function that
takes a pair of numbers (natural, rational, real, imaginary) to their (additive) sum. When
the ‘+’ sign is used in an expression such as ‘(x + y)2 = x2 + 2xy + y2’, then this is the
obvious way to understand it. It signiﬁes the addition function. But what should the ‘+’
sign signify in the expression:
sq AB ≡ sq AC + sq C +2 rect AC,CB
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Fig. 3 | Diagramm
One possibility is that the terms for geometric ﬁgures (‘sq AC’ etc.) stand for areas, i.e.,
for real numbers, to which an area function maps the given ﬁgures. Then ‘+’ would have
a familiar and well-deﬁned meaning, namely the addition function on the reals. But this
is obviously not what is intended by the commentators who use ‘+’. For the whole point
of writing the above expression was to avoid the use of the real numbers and to remain,
rather, with geometric ﬁgures.
Given that we interpret Euclid II.4 in terms of geometric ﬁgures, then there is a serious
question about the meaning of ‘+’. What does it mean to add two geometric ﬁgures, if it
does notmean adding their areas? One thing it might mean is that the ﬁgures are to be put
together, boundary on boundary, without overlapping or leaving any gap, so as to form
another ﬁgure. This third ﬁgure, of which both initial ﬁgures are parts, would be their
sum. (See Figure 4.) But this is quite clearly not what Euclid means in the propositions in
question. And Euclid often uses the same-size-as relation without concatenating the ﬁgures
in question. Consider, for instance, Euclid’s formulation of the Pythagorean theorem
(Book I, Proposition 47): “In right-angled triangles, the square on the side subtending
the right angle is equal to the squares on the sides containing the right angle.” Some
translators, such as Fitzpatrick, insert a phrase such as ‘the sum of’, so that the theorem
reads, ‘In right-angled triangles, the square on the side subtending the right angle is
equal to the sum of the squares on the sides containing the right angle’ (emphasis added).
Whatever ‘the sum of two squares’ means, it cannot mean ‘a ﬁgure composed out of two
squares’. For Euclid constructs the squares on the sides containing the right angle in such
a way that they do not compose a single ﬁgure. (Their boundaries meet at a single point
and thus the deﬁnition of a ﬁgure does not apply.) There is nothing in the diagram or in
the demonstration that corresponds to the composition of the two squares. What, then,
does ‘+’ or ‘sum’ mean here?
Rather than answering this question, we propose a new way of understanding the
same-size-as relation. Unlike the identity relation, this relation might not be a straightfor-
ward two-place relation. Of course, sometimes it is used to assert the sameness of size of
two items, but it can also be used to assert that one item is the same size as two other
items – not severally but, as translators sometimes write, ‘taken together’. ‘Taken together’
does not express the application of a function or operation, but just makes clear that the
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Fig. 4 | Diagramm
items belong together on one side of the same-size-as relation. Thus Euclid’s formulation of
the Pythagorean theorem makes no use of addition. It can be better written:
Square on side subtending right angle≡ square on one side containing right angle,
square on other side containing right angle
In other words, the sign ‘+’ is quite misleading. No operation whatsoever is performed
on the squares in question. The equality relation simply applies directly to them. In the
same way, Euclid II.4 should be written without ‘=’ and without ‘+’, thus:
sq AB ≡ sq AC, sq CB, 2 rect AC,CB
Note that the right-hand side can hardly be a mereological sum, since it has twice the
rectangle AC,CB. (The mereological sum of Socrates and Socrates is just Socrates.) This is
not, however, to say that Euclid makes no use of concatenation (roughly, putting together
ﬁgures in such away that they compose another ﬁgure, of which they are parts). It is just to
say that concatenation is not used in the statements of theorems such as the Pythagorean
theorem.
But Euclid does often use dissection and concatenation of ﬁgures. It is in this context
that he uses the concepts of part and whole, which are the focus of our interest. Perhaps
the ﬁrst mathematically interesting theorem in which this occurs is Book I, Proposition
35: “Parallelograms which are on the same base and between the same parallels are equal
to one another.”
The proof proceeds as follows (see Fig. 5). First, triangles ABE andDCF are proved
to be congruent to one another. Now, a dissection is performed. The triangle DGE,
which is precisely the overlap between triangles ABE and DCF , is removed and the
remainders (two trapezoids) are therefore equal. What happens here is quite different
from an ordinary algebraic operation (the rewriting of an equation containing variables
that stand for real numbers). We have two continuous geometric ﬁgures. We observe that
each ﬁgure is composed of two parts, a trapezoid and the triangleDGE, and on this basis
infer that the trapezoids are equal. In algebra, there are no continuous wholes of this kind.
Euclid is relying on the common notion that says if equals are taken from equals, then the
remainders are equal. But this common notion is a statement about wholes and parts –
in particular, that if two parts of two equal wholes are equal, then the remainders are also
equal. It is thus very different from the rules for manipulation of equations in algebra.
These rules are based on facts about binary functions on the real numbers. The concepts
of part and whole play no role.
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Fig. 5 | Diagramm
A major goal of our project is to clarify the assumptions about parts and wholes that
underlie Euclid I.35 and, indeed, all of Euclidean geometry. This paper is but a small ﬁrst
step in that project. Roughly, Euclid seems to rely on three assumption. First, he assumes
lines bounding the parallelograms do not have any area.
Second, he assumes that if a ﬁgure has an internal boundary (the line DG in the
triangle ABE, the line GE in the triangle DCF ), then it is composed of two ﬁgures,
each of which has that boundary as an external boundary. This assumption is not terribly
bold or surprising. It just says that if a ﬁgure is divided by a line or a plane, then that line
or plane divides it into two ﬁgures.
Third, Euclid relies on the opposite assumption. He composes the triangleBGC with
each of the trapezoids. Since the trapezoids were equal, and each is being composed with
one and the same triangle BGC, the resulting ﬁgures, i.e., the parallelograms ABCD
and BEFC, are equal. Again, this is not an operation on numbers, but on ﬁgures. And
the operation is not the application of a binary function to a set of objects, all of which
could equally be arguments of the function, but is rather the application of a principle
of composition. If two non-overlapping ﬁgures share a line as a boundary, then there is a
third ﬁgure composed of both of them. This assumption is also unsurprising and entirely
reasonable. But it is not an assumption that interpreters have identiﬁed and discussed.
So there are very strong reasons to think that Euclid relies on the concepts of part
and whole in his reasoning about ﬁgures and their sizes. But in order to give a precise and
rigorous account of how this works, we need to return to the beginning of the Elements and
determine precisely where and how its demonstrations rely on these concepts. Otherwise,
it might well be that Euclid does not in fact, in any essential way, rely on those concepts
in Book II, even if he seems to.
3 Formal proofs of Elements I.1–3
In this section, we begin the task of giving proofs in formal languages. (We are using
‘demonstration’ for a section the Euclidean text (the apodeixis), reserving ‘proof’ for a
sequence of sentences that is a proof by the standards of contemporary logic. That is, ‘demon-
stration’ refers to what is called in Greek the apodeixis, in the Proclan analysis of a propo-
sition into enunciation, setting forth, determination, construction, demonstration, and
conclusion. Thus the demonstrations (Euclid’s writing) are not necessarily proofs.) We
will use the language of ﬁrst-order predicate logic and supplement it with a number of
predicates. Even the determination of these predicates is a non-trivial matter.
There are two aspects of Euclid’s reasoning that we will neglect. First, he always pro-
ceeds by ekthesis. That is, having stated the result to be proved in general terms, he intro-
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duces a particular instance (‘Let there be a triangle ABC’), carries out the construction
and demonstration, and then infers the general result. While this is an important and
interesting aspect of Euclid’s procedure, we neglect it because it would introduce major
complications and it does not seems necessary in order to answer our immediate ques-
tions about parts and wholes. Second, Euclid’s formulations of propositions fall into two
groups, so-called problems and theorems. The theorems are expressed in truth-valuable
assertoric sentences. The problems, by contrast, are expressed with inﬁnitival clauses. The
ﬁrst proposition of the Elements is: “On a given a given bounded straight line, to construct
an equilateral triangle”. We are much interested in the distinction between theorems and
problems (and it is the topic of a work in progress by Jonathan Beere and Ben Morison),
but for our purposes in this paper, we will treat problems as ∀∃-sentences. So, for instance,
we will treat the proposition just mentioned as, “For every bounded straight line, there
exists an equilateral triangle with that straight line as side”.
3.1 Language and axioms for stating Elements I.1
Let us begin at the beginning, with the demonstration of the proposition just noted. This
proposition uses the predicates, ‘…is a straight line’, ‘…is an equilateral triangle’, and ‘…is
on …’. We should begin by considering the question of how to deﬁne these notions, if at
all. How does Euclid deﬁne them?
He deﬁnes a straight line as a line “that lies evenly [ἐξ ἴσου] with the points on itself”
(I, def. 4). This deﬁnition is perhaps the most obscure that Euclid gives, and he gives
no explicit axioms that involve the predicate ‘lies evenly’. More helpful is the previous
deﬁnition,which says about all lines (not only straight ones) that their extremes are points.
We will assume that, for each straight line, there are precisely two of them, which we will
call ‘endpoints of s’. The ﬁrst postulate of the Elements says (in our revised version), “For
every pair of points, A and B, there is a straight line from A to B′′. We take this to mean
that A and B are the endpoints of the straight line.
Euclid will also assume that there is only one straight line between a given pair of
points. Euclid already makes this assumption in his proof of I.4 (which corresponds to
the theorem now commonly known as SAS). Thus we might formalize our strengthened
version of Postulate 1 in two ways. First:
∀xy (x is a point and y is a point and x ̸= y → ∃1z (z is a straight line from x to y))
Or alternatively:
∀xy (x is a point and y is a point and x ̸= y → ∃1z (z is a straight line and x is an
endpoint of z and y is an endpoint of z))
The difference is that the ﬁrst version uses a three-place predicate (‘…is a straight line from
…to …’) whereas the second version uses a one-place predicate and a two-place predicate
(‘…is a straight line’ and ‘…is an endpoint of …’). Which version should we prefer?
To begin with, note that the three-place predicate can be deﬁned in terms of the other
two, or the other two in terms of the three-place predicate. Assuming the three-place
predicate, we can introduce the following deﬁnitions:
z is a straight line :↔ ∃xy (x ̸= y and z is a straight line from x to y)
x is an endpoint of z :↔ ∃y (x ̸= y and (z is a straight line from x to y or z is a
straight line from y to x))
Assuming the one-place and two-place predicates, we can deﬁne the three-place predicate
as follows:
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z is a straight line from x to y :↔ x ̸= y and z is a straight line and x is an endpoint
of z and y is an endpoint of z
Which deﬁnition constitutes the superior interpretation of the Euclidean text? Deﬁni-
tion 4 from the Elements seems to deﬁne ‘straight line’ as a one-place predicate (“a straight
line is one that lies evenly with the points on itself”). On the other hand, Deﬁnition 3
says that the extremities of a line (any line, whether curved or straight) are points and this
suggests that the predicatemay havemore than one place.Moreover, Euclid normally (but
not always) refers to lines by two end-points, as at the beginning of the demonstration of
I.1, where he says, “LetAB be a given straight line.” This speaks in favor of the three-place
predicate.
Furthermore, we incline to think that using a three-place predicate is themore elegant
way to develop our formal language. It allows us to formulate many propositions more
compactly, using a single three-place predicate, rather than three conjoined sentences
(corresponding to the deﬁnition above).
Similar considerations apply to the predicate ‘triangle’. Euclid deﬁnes a triangle as, “a
rectilinear ﬁgure contained by three straight lines” (I, def. 19) and an equilateral triangle
as a triangle that has three equal sides (I, def. 20). As a straight line is determined by 2
objects that are not themselves straight lines – its endpoints – so a triangle is determined
by 3 objects that are not themselves triangles – its straight-line sides. By analogy with
our three-place predicate ‘…is a straight line from…to …’, we will work with a four-place
predicate, ‘Triangle …is determined by …, …, …’ But here we have a choice between
deﬁning triangles as determined by their vertices or by their sides. That is: are the three
determining objects points or lines?
The deﬁnition of triangle just cited suggests that triangles are determined by their
sides, not by their vertices. But Euclid’s way of proceeding in his demonstrations suggests
the contrary. For he refers to triangles by way of their vertices, in expressions such as, ‘The
triangle ABC ′. We will give priority to Euclid’s procedure in the demonstrations rather
than to his explicit deﬁnition, and deﬁne triangles in terms of their vertices. Hence we
use the predicate:
x is a triangle with vertices a, b, and c
Thus the deﬁnition of equilateral triangle takes the following form: the triangle with
vertices a, b, and c is equilateral if and only if the straight lines between the three pairs of
points are equally long. Thus we also need a predicate ‘…is as long as …’ In Section 2, we
already argued that Euclid will use a similar equality-predicate for ﬁgures. Here, we are
introducing such a predicate for lines.
Thus far, our language L[E] contains the following predicates:
Px x is a point
x ≡ y Straight line x is equal to (as long as) straight line y
Ssxy s is a straight line from x to y
∆xabc x is a triangle with vertices a, b, c
Thus Proposition 1 is written as follows in L[E] as developed so far7:
7 For the reader who is innocent of logic, the following guidemight be useful. ‘∀abc’ is read ‘for every a,b,c’.
‘∃abc’ is read ‘there exist a,b,c such that …’. ‘a = b’ is read ‘a is identical with b’. ‘→’ is always ﬂanked
by statements; it is read ‘if [ﬁrst statement] then [second statement]’. Following the usual convention, we
write the predicates before the terms they apply to (e.g., ‘Sx’ is read ‘x is a straight line’). ‘⊢’ may be read
‘it is a theorem that …’ If ﬂanked by lists of statements, it is read ‘[statements on left] entail [statement
on right]’.
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∀xab (Sxab→ ∃y (∆yabx ∧ y is an equilateral triangle ∧ y is on x))
This formalization ﬁts well with Euclid’s actual way of proceeding in Proposition 1. Infor-
mally, one would begin a proof of this proposition by saying, ‘Let a and b be two arbitrary
points and s the straight line between them’. Setting asidemere notational differences, this
is precisely how Euclid begins.
The predicate ‘y is on x’ is not deﬁned by Euclid. We assume that this predicate means
the same as ‘x is a side of y’ (if y is a triangle and x is a straight line). We can then rewrite
Proposition 1:
∀xab(Sxab→ ∃a′b′c′yss′s′′(∆ya′b′c′∧Ssa′b′∧Ss′a′c′∧Ss′′b′c′∧s ≡ s′∧s ≡ s′′
∧ s′ ≡ s′′ ∧ (x = s ∨ x = s′ ∨ x = s′′)))
By symmetry, it is irrelevant which side of the triangle y is the given straight line x. We
can thus stipulate without loss of generality that x is s, which simpliﬁes the formula as
follows:
∀xab(Sxab→ ∃a′b′c′yss′s′′(∆ya′b′c′∧Ssa′b′∧Ss′a′c′∧Ss′′b′c′∧s ≡ s′∧s ≡ s′′
∧ s′ ≡ s′′ ∧ x = s))
But this is obviously equivalent to:
∀xab(Sxab→ ∃a′b′c′ycs′s′′ (∆ya′b′c′∧Sxa′b′∧Ss′a′c′∧Ss′′b′c′∧x ≡ s′∧x ≡ s′′
∧ s′ ≡ s′′))
This formulation could also be further simpliﬁed, should we obtain suitable axioms
for the expressions used in it, as we will go on to do.
We begin by stating a number of natural axioms for the predicates ‘P ’, ‘S’, and ‘≡’. We
will use ‘S’ as a one-place predicate with the deﬁnition (stated above)
Sz :↔ ∃xy Szxy.
(Ax 1) ∀xys (Ssxy → Px ∧ Py)
(Ax 2) ∀xys (Ssxy → x ̸= y)
(Ax 3) ∀xys (Ssxy → Ssyx)
(Ax 4) ∀xyss′ (Ssxy ∧ Ss′xy → s = s′)
(Ax 5) ∀xy (Px ∧ Py ∧ x ̸= y → ∃sSsxy)
(Ax 6) ∀xyabs (Ssxy ∧ Ssab→ (x = a ∧ y = b) ∨ (x = b ∧ y = a))
(Ax 7) ∀xy (x ≡ y → Sx ∧ Sy)
(Ax 8) ∀x (Sx→ x ≡ x)
(Ax 9) ∀xy (x ≡ y → y ≡ x)
(Ax 10) ∀xy (x ≡ y ∧ y ≡ z → x ≡ z)
To investigate the role of the part-whole relation, we will need an ‘…is a part of …’
predicate, ‘⊑’. For the moment, we introduce the following purely mereological axioms:
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(Ax 11) ∀x (x ⊑ x)8
(Ax 12) ∀xyz (x ⊑ y ∧ y ⊑ z → x ⊑ z)
(Ax 13) ∀xy (x ⊑ y ∧ y ⊑ x→ x = y)
In addition, we will introduce the following axioms that employ both mereological
and geometric predicates:
(Ax 14) ∀x (Px→ ∃y (Py ∧ x ̸= y))
(Ax 15) ∀xys (Ssxy → x ⊑ s ∧ y ⊑ s)
(Ax 16) ∀xyst (Ss ∧ Stxy ∧ x ⊑ s ∧ y ⊑ s→ t ⊑ s)
Finally, we need axioms governing the predicate ∆. These axioms say that there is a
triangle between three points if and only if the points are not collinear. Thus we need a
three-place predicate for collinearity:
Deﬁnition: Coll(abc) :↔ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ ∃s (Ss ∧ a ⊑ s ∧ b ⊑ s ∧ c ⊑ s)
(Ax 17) ∀abcx (∆xabc→ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ ¬Coll(abc))
(Ax 18) ∀abc (Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ ¬Coll(abc)→ ∃x∆xabc)
Using these axioms and deﬁnitions, we prove the following four-part lemma:
Lemma 1: (i) (Ax 6) ⊢ ∀xyzst (Ssxy ∧ Stxz ∧ s = t→ y = z)
(ii) (Ax 5, 14, 15) ⊢ ∀x (Px→ ∃y (Sy ∧ x ⊑ y))
(iii) (Ax 5, 14, 15) ⊢ ∀xyz (Px ∧ Py ∧ Pz ∧ ¬Coll(xyz)→ x ̸= y ∧ x ̸= z ∧ y ̸= z)
(iv) (Ax 5, 14, 15) ⊢ ∀xyz (Px ∧ Py ∧ Pz ∧ ¬Coll(xyz)→ ∃s Ssxy)
Proof: (i) By (Ax 6).
(ii) By (Ax 5), (Ax 14) and (Ax 15).
(iii) By (ii) and (Ax 5).
(iv) By (iii) and (Ax 5).
Relative to these axioms, the formalization of Proposition 1 from the end of the last
section is equivalent to:
∀xab (Sxab→ ∃ycss′ (∆yabc ∧ Ssac ∧ Ss′bc ∧ x ≡ s ∧ x ≡ s′))
This is the version that we will now go on to prove.
3.2 Circles
Early in the demonstration of I.1, Euclid constructs two circles, using postulate 3, one
having A as center with B on its circumference, the other having B as center with A on
its circumference. See Figure 6. Euclid assumes that the two circles intersect.
8 Euclid would surely not have accepted this axiom. In this ﬁrst version, we use it because it has been a
part of standard mereology. In a future revised version, we hope to avoid this axiom. On the other hand,
it does not seem to cause any serious problem, because one can easily restrict parts to proper parts.
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Fig. 6 | Diagramm
This is obvious from the diagram. However, intuitively, one would not consider the fol-
lowing statement to be a logical truth:
∀xyab (x is a circle around a through b ∧ y is a circle around b through a→ x and
y intersect)
Nor does this sentence seem to follow from Euclid’s deﬁnitions, postulates, and common
notions.
Euclid deﬁnes a circle as a ﬁgure enclosed by a single line such that all lines from
a certain privileged point – the center – to the enclosing line are equal (I, def. 15). The
enclosing line is called the circumference (perhaps in def .15 – there is a textual difficulty
– but certainly in def. 17). And the third postulate is “to describe a circle with any given
center and radius”. We will here use the word ‘circle’ for the enclosing line. Like straight
lines and triangles, circles are deﬁned by certain points, namely the center and another
point that determines the straight line that is the radius. By analogy with the predicates
‘S’ and ‘∆’, we introduce a three-place predicate, ‘K’. ‘Kxab’ is to be read ‘x is a circle
around center a through b’. By analogy with Postulate 1, Postulate 3 from the Elements can
be stated:
(Ax 19) ∀xys (Px ∧ Py ∧ Ssxy → ∃z Kzxy)
We base our deﬁnition of the predicate ‘K’ on Euclid’s deﬁnition 15:
Deﬁnition: Kxyz :↔ Py ∧ Pz ∧ z ⊑ x ∧ ∀w (Pw ∧ w ⊑ x→ y ̸= w)
∧ ∀wss′ (Pw ∧ Ssyz ∧ Ss′yw → (w ⊑ x↔ s ≡ s′))
An immediate consequence of this deﬁnition is:
Lemma 2: ⊢ ∀xyzkst (Kkxy ∧ Ssxy ∧ Stxz ∧ z ⊑ k → s ≡ t)
In order to ﬁll the hole in the proof, it would be natural to use this axiom:
∀abkk′ (Pa ∧ Pb ∧ a ̸= b ∧Kkab ∧Kk′ba→ ∃c (Pc ∧ c ⊑ k ∧ c ⊑ k′))
But this is not, in fact, sufficient. For the intersection points of the circles cannot be
collinear with the centers of the circles. That is, Euclid relies on this fact in his proof, since
otherwise the three points would not be vertices of a triangle. Since we do not see how
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to infer this from the axioms (those we have stated thus far), we strengthen this axiom for
the moment in the following way:
(Ax 20−) ∀abkk′ (Pa ∧ Pb ∧ a ̸= b ∧Kkab ∧Kk′ba
→ ∃c (Pc ∧ c ⊑ k ∧ c ⊑ k′ ∧ ¬Coll(abc)))
This formulation asserts the existence of (at least) one point of intersection, whereas
we will later need two points of intersection (e.g., in Proposition 10), which lie on op-
posite sides of the line between the circles’ centers. We thus suggest the following, yet
stronger axiom:
(Ax 20) ∀abkk′s (Ssab ∧ Kkab ∧ Kk′ba → ∃cc′td (Pc ∧ c ⊑ k ∧ c ⊑ k′ ∧
Pc′ ∧ c′ ⊑ k ∧ c′ ⊑ k′ ∧ Stcc′ ∧ Pd ∧ d ⊑ s ∧ d ⊑ t ∧ ¬Coll(abc) ∧
¬Coll(abc′)∧¬Coll(cac′)∧¬Coll(cbc′)∧¬Coll(acd)∧¬Coll(bcd)))
3.3 Proof of Elements I.1
The demonstration of I.1 does not assert the existence of a triangle until its concluding
line. Up to that point, the demonstration leads up to the following intermediate conclu-
sion:
∀xab (Sxab→ ∃css′ (¬Coll(abc) ∧ Ssac ∧ Ss′bc ∧ x ≡ s ∧ x ≡ s′))
We will begin by proving this statement.
Proposition 1, Version 1:LetΣ := {(Ax 1), (Ax 2), (Ax 3), (Ax 5), (Ax 14), (Ax 15), (Ax 19), (Ax 20−)};
then
Σ ⊢ ∀xab (Sxab→ ∃css′ (¬Coll(abc) ∧ Ssac ∧ Ss′bc ∧ x ≡ s ∧ x ≡ s′))
Proof:With (Ax 1), (Ax 2) and (Ax 19), we have:
(Ax 1, 2, 19) ⊢ Sxab→ a ̸= b∧ Pa∧ Pb→ a ̸= b∧ Pa∧ Pb∧ ∃k Kkab∧ ∃k Kkba
With (Ax 20−), it then follows that:
(Ax 1, 2, 19, 20−) ⊢ Sxab→ ∃ckk′ (Pc∧c ⊑ k∧c ⊑ k′∧Kkab∧Kk′ba∧¬Col(abc))
By the deﬁnition of ‘K’, this entails:
(Ax 1, 2, 19, 20−) ⊢ Sxab→ ∃ckk′ (¬Coll(abc) ∧ Pc ∧ c ⊑ k ∧ ∀wss′ (Pw ∧w ⊑ k
∧ Ssab ∧ Ss′aw → s ≡ s′) ∧ c ⊑ k′ ∧ ∀wss′ (Pw ∧ w ⊑ k′ ∧ Ssba ∧ Ss′bw → s ≡ s′))
Therefore,
(Ax 1, 2, 19, 20−) ⊢ Sxab→ ∃ckk′ (¬Coll(abc) ∧ Pc ∧ c ⊑ k ∧ ∀s′ (Pc ∧ c ⊑ k
∧ Sxab ∧ Ss′ac→ x ≡ s′) ∧ Pc ∧ c ⊑ k′ ∧ ∀s′ (Pc ∧ c ⊑ k′ ∧ Sxba ∧ Ss′bc→ x ≡ s′))
From (Ax 1) and (Ax 3), we then get:
(Ax 1, 2, 3, 19, 20−) ⊢ Sxab→ ∃c(¬Coll(abc)∧Pa∧Pb∧Pc∧∀s′ (Ss′ac→ x ≡ s′)
∧ Pc ∧ ∀s′ (Ss′bc→ x ≡ s′))
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From this and Lemma 1, we can infer the claim to be demonstrated:
Σ ⊢ Sxab
→ ∃c(¬Coll(abc)∧∃sSsac∧∀s′ (Ss′ac→ x ≡ s′)∧∃sSsbc∧∀s′ (Ss′bc→ x ≡ s′))
→ ∃css′ (¬Coll(abc) ∧ Ssac ∧ Ss′bc ∧ x ≡ s ∧ x ≡ s′)
From the conclusion of Proposition 1, Version 1, and (Ax 18) (plus (Ax 1)), we can
immediately infer:
Proposition 1, Version 2: Take Σ from Proposition 1, Version 1. Then
Σ ∪ {Ax 18} ⊢ ∀xab (Sxab→ ∃ycss′ (∆yabc ∧ Ssac ∧ Ss′bc ∧ x ≡ s ∧ x ≡ s′))
3.4 Proofs of Elements I.2–3
For the next two propositions, we will also need to ﬁll in gaps, but this is yet more
complicated than for Proposition 1. Propositions 2 and 3 are problems. Reformulated
as assertions, they are:
Fig. 7 | Diagramm
Proposition 2. “For any given point and given straight line, there is a straight line equal
to the given straight line with the given point as an endpoint.” (see Fig. 7).
Proposition 3. “For any two given unequal straight lines, there is a straight line that is
equal to the lesser given straight line and is part of the greater given straight line.” (see
Fig. 8).
It is clear that Proposition 2 plays a crucial role in the demonstration of Proposition
3. But Proposition 3 is more than a corollary to Proposition 2. For Proposition 3 is the
ﬁrst occasion that Euclid speaks of straight lines being larger than others. That requires
new axioms.
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Fig. 8 | Diagramm
However, there are several signiﬁcant gaps in the demonstration of Proposition 2. For
instance, how do we know that there is a point G on the circle around B, which lies on
the straight line BG? See Figure 7. In theproposition demonstration, Postulate 2 is used to
justify this claim. Postulate 2 is ‘to extend a given straight line continuously in a straight
line’. But it is not clear how to formulate Postulate 2 in our framework.
In order to demonstrate Proposition 2, we propose three new axioms, (Ax 21.1), (Ax
21.2), and (Ax 22).
(Ax 21.1) ∀xyzsk (Ssxy ∧Kkxz → ∃ws′ (Pw ∧ Ss′yw ∧ s ⊑ s′ ∧ w ⊑ k))
(Ax 21.2) ∀xyzsk (Ssxy ∧Kkxz → ∃wtt′ (Pw ∧ Stxw ∧ St′ ∧ t′ ⊑ s ∧ t′ ⊑ t
∧w ⊑ k))
On the one hand, these axioms are both visually plausible. On the other hand, they
are, admittedly, formulated to ﬁll the gap in this demonstration. We will have to critically
examine whether they are merely ad hoc and useful only in this case, or whether they are
generally useful. From (Ax 21.1) and (Ax 21.2), we ﬁrst derive this lemma:
Lemma 3: (Ax 5, 21.1) ⊢ ∀xyzsk (Ssxy∧Kkxz → ∃ws′t (Pw∧Ss′yw∧ s ⊑ s′∧w ⊑ k
∧Stxw))
Proof:With (Ax 21.1) in the ﬁrst step, the deﬁnition of ‘K’ in the second step, and (Ax 5)
in the third step, we have:
(Ax 5, 21.1) ⊢ Ssxy ∧Kkxz → ∃ws′ (Pw ∧ Ss′yw ∧ s ⊑ s′ ∧ w ⊑ k ∧Kkxz)
→ ∃ws′ (Pw ∧ Ss′yw ∧ s ⊑ s′ ∧ w ⊑ k ∧ x ̸= w)
→ ∃ws′ (Pw ∧ Ss′yw ∧ s ⊑ s′ ∧ w ⊑ k ∧ ∃t Stxw)
Moreover, the so-called Common Notions play a nontrivial role for the ﬁrst time in
the Elements. In particular, we need an axiom that corresponds to Common Notion 3 (‘if
equals be taken away from equals, the remainders are equal’):
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(Ax 22) ∀xyzx′y′z′ss′tt′vv′ (Ssxy∧Ss′x′y′∧s ≡ s′∧Stxz∧St′x′z′∧ t ≡ t′
∧ t ⊑ s ∧ t′ ⊑ s′ ∧ Svzy ∧ Sv′z′y′ → v ≡ v′)
It turns out that a variant on (Ax 21.2) is useful for the proof of Proposition 2, formu-
lated not in terms of the part-whole relation but in terms of the greater-less relation. Thus
we ﬁrst introduce the ‘greater-less’ predicate for straight lines and gives axioms for it. This
ﬁgures in the proof of Proposition 2. And Proposition 3 will then be proved using both
these axioms and Proposition 2.
Let us extend L[E] by the two-place predicate ‘<’. ‘x < y’ is read ‘(straight line) y is
longer than (straight line) x’. The following should be plausible axioms for ‘<’:
(Ax 23) ∀st (s < t→ Ss ∧ St)
(Ax 24) ∀stu (s < t ∧ t < u→ s < u)
(Ax 25) ∀st (Ss ∧ St→ s < t ∨ s ≡ t ∨ t < s)
(Ax 26) ∀st (s ≡ t→ ¬(s < t))
(Ax 27) ∀st (Ss ∧ St ∧ s ⊑ t→ s ≤ t)9
(Ax 28) ∀stabc (Ssab ∧ Stac ∧ ∃t′ (St′ ∧ t′ ⊑ s ∧ t′ ⊑ t) ∧ s ≤ t→ s ⊑ t)
where we have deﬁned: s ≤ t :↔ s < t ∨ s ≡ t
Lemma 4: (i) ⊢ ∀st (s ≡ t→ s ≤ t)
(ii) (Ax 8, 26) ⊢ ∀s (Ss→ ¬s < s)
(iii) (Ax 9, 26) ⊢ ∀st (s ≡ t→ ¬(t < s))
(iv) (Ax 9, 23, 24, 25, 26) ⊢ ∀stu (s ≡ t ∧ s < u→ t < u)
(v) (Ax 9, 23, 24, 25, 26) ⊢ ∀stu (s ≡ t ∧ u < s→ u < t)
(vi) (Ax 9, 10, 23, 24, 25, 26) ⊢ ∀stu (s ≤ t ∧ t ≤ u→ s ≤ u)
Proof: (i) Immediate from the deﬁnition.
(ii) (Ax 26) implies ‘∀s (s ≡ s→ ¬(s < s))’. The claim follows by (Ax 8).
(iii) Follows from (Ax 9) and (Ax 26).
(iv) By (Ax 23) and (Ax 25), we have
(*) (Ax 23, 25) ⊢ s ≡ t ∧ s < u ∧ ¬t < u→ St ∧ Su ∧ s < u ∧ (t ≡ u ∨ u < t)
Yet from (Ax 9) and (Ax 26), we have
(**) (Ax 9, 26) ⊢ s ≡ t ∧ s < u ∧ ¬t < u ∧ t ≡ u→ s < u ∧ s ≡ u
→⊥
While from (Ax 24) and (Ax 26), we have
(***) (Ax 24, 26) ⊢ s ≡ t ∧ s < u ∧ ¬t < u ∧ u < t→ s < t ∧ s ≡ t
→⊥
9 This corresponds to Common Notion 5, ‘The whole is greater than the part’.
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Together (*), (**), and (***) entail:
(Ax 9, 23, 24, 25, 26) ⊢ s ≡ t ∧ s < u ∧ ¬t < u→⊥,
which yields the claim to be proved.
(v) Proved like (iv).
(vi) Follows from (Ax 10) and (Ax 24) and (iv) or (v).
Lemma 5: (i) (Ax 11, 28) ⊢ ∀xyzst (Ssxy ∧ Stxz ∧ t ⊑ s ∧ s ≤ t→ s ⊑ t)
(ii) (Ax 11, 13, 28) ⊢ ∀xyzst (Ssxy ∧ Stxz ∧ t ⊑ s ∧ s ≤ t→ s = t)
(iii) (Ax 5, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 28) ⊢ ∀xyzst (Ssxy ∧ Stxz ∧ z ⊑ s ∧ s ≡ t → s =
t ∧ y = z)
Proof: (i) With (Ax 11) for the ﬁrst step and (Ax 28) for the second step, we have
(Ax 11, 28) ⊢ Ssxy∧Stxz∧ t ⊑ s∧s ≤ t→ Ssxy∧Stxz∧∃t′ (St′∧ t′ ⊑ s∧ t′ ⊑ t)
∧ s ≤ t
→ s ⊑ t
(ii) From (i), by (Ax 13).
(iii) By (Ax 15) and then by (Ax 16), we have:
(Ax 15, 16) ⊢ Ssxy ∧ z ⊑ s ∧ Stxz → Ssxy ∧ x ⊑ s ∧ z ⊑ s ∧ Stxz
→ t ⊑ s
Together with (ii), this entails:
(Ax 11, 13, 15, 16, 28) ⊢ Ssxy∧ z ⊑ s∧Stxz∧ s ≡ t→ Ssxy∧Stxz∧ t ⊑ s∧ s ≤ t
→ s = t
This and Lemma 1(iii) imply then:
(Ax 5, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 28) ⊢ Ssxy ∧ z ⊑ s ∧ Stxz ∧ s ≡ t→ s = t ∧ Ssxy ∧ Stxz
→ y = z,
and the claim is thereby proven.
With these preliminary axioms (Ax 1) – (Ax 28 and the new ‘<’ predicate, we are ready
to prove Propositions 2 and 3.
We divide Proposition 2 into two cases. In the ﬁrst case, the endpoint at which the
constructed line is to be place is identical with an endpoint of the given line. In the second
case, neither endpoint of the given line is identical with the given point. The proof of the
ﬁrst case is straightforward. The proof of the second case is more involved.
Proposition 2, 1st case: (Ax 8) ⊢ ∀abcu (a = b ∧ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ Subc → ∃lw (Pl ∧
Swal ∧ u ≡ w))
Proof: Using (Ax 8) in the second step, we have
(Ax 8) ⊢ a = b ∧ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ Subc→ Pc ∧ Suac
→ Pc ∧ Suac ∧ u ≡ u
→ ∃lw (Pl ∧ Swal ∧ u ≡ w)
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In the remaining section, “⊢” means “(Ax 1) – (Ax 28) ⊢”.
Lemma 6: (i) ⊢ Sxab ∧ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ Subc
→ ∃dyzk (Pd ∧ ¬Coll(abd) ∧ Syad ∧ Szbd ∧ x ≡ y ∧ x ≡ z ∧ Kkbc)
(ii) ⊢ Subc ∧ Szbd ∧Kkbc
→ ∃gs′t′ (Pg ∧ Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ g ⊑ k ∧ St′bg ∧ u ≡ t′ ∧ t′ ⊑ s′)
(iii) ⊢ z ≡ y ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ Syda ∧ Ss′dg
→ ∃k′lt (Kk′dg ∧ Pl ∧ Stdl ∧ y ⊑ t ∧ l ⊑ k′ ∧ s′ ≡ t)
(iv) ⊢ z ≡ y ∧ Stdl ∧ Syda ∧ s′ ≡ t ∧ Ss′dg ∧ Szdb ∧ St′bg ∧ z ⊑ s′ → a ̸= l
Proof: (i) From the ﬁrst version of the formalization of Proposition 1, we have:
⊢ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Sxab→ ∃dyz (Pd ∧ ¬Coll(abd) ∧ Syad ∧ Szbd ∧ x ≡ y ∧ x ≡ z)
Also, by (Ax 19),
⊢ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ Subc→ ∃k Kkbc
These statements imply the claim to be proved.
(ii) From Lemma 3, we have
⊢ Szbd ∧Kkbc→ ∃gs′t′ (Pg ∧ Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ g ⊑ k ∧ St′bg)
From this, using (Ax 15) in the ﬁrst step, (Ax 12) in the second step, and (Ax 16) in the
third step, we obtain:
⊢ Szbd ∧Kkbc→ ∃gs′t′ (Pg ∧ Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ g ⊑ k ∧ St′bg ∧ b ⊑ z ∧ g ⊑ s′)
→ ∃gs′t′ (Pg ∧ Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ g ⊑ k ∧ St′bg ∧ b ⊑ s′ ∧ g ⊑ s′)
→ ∃gs′t′ (Pg ∧ Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ g ⊑ k ∧ St′bg ∧ t′ ⊑ s′)
Therefore
(*) ⊢ Subc∧Szbd∧Kkbc→ ∃gs′t′(Pg∧Ss′dg∧z ⊑ s′∧Kkbc∧Subc∧St′bg∧g ⊑ k
∧ t′ ⊑ s′)
Now, by Lemma 2,
(**) ⊢ Kkbc ∧ Subc ∧ St′bg ∧ g ⊑ k→ u ≡ t′
(*) and (**) entail the claim to be proved.
(iii) (Ax 21.2) yieds
⊢ Syda ∧Kk′dg → ∃ltt′ (Pl ∧ Stdl ∧ St′ ∧ t′ ⊑ y ∧ t′ ⊑ t ∧ l ⊑ k′)
which entails
⊢ Syda ∧ Ss′dg ∧Kk′dg → ∃ltt′ (Pl ∧ St′ ∧ t′ ⊑ y ∧ t′ ⊑ t ∧Kk′dg ∧ Ss′dg ∧ Stdl ∧ l ⊑ k′)
In addition, by Lemma 2,
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⊢ Kk′dg ∧ Ss′dg ∧ Stdl ∧ l ⊑ k′ → s′ ≡ t
These two lines imply
⊢ Syda∧Ss′dg∧Kk′dg → ∃ltt′(Pl∧Syda∧Stdl∧St′∧t′ ⊑ y∧t′ ⊑ t∧l ⊑ k′∧s′ ≡ t)
Now this implies, with (Ax 27) in the ﬁrst step, Lemma 4 in the second step and (Ax
28) in the third step:
⊢ z ≡ y ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ Syda ∧ Ss′dg ∧Kk′dg
→ ∃ltt′(Pl∧Syda∧Stdl∧St′∧t′ ⊑ y∧t′ ⊑ t∧l ⊑ k′∧s′ ≡ t∧z ≡ y∧z ≤ s′)
→ ∃ltt′ (Pl ∧ Syda∧ Stdl ∧ St′ ∧ t′ ⊑ y ∧ t′ ⊑ t∧ y ≤ t∧ l ⊑ k′ ∧ s′ ≡ t)
→ ∃ltt′ (Pl ∧ Syda∧ Stdl ∧ St′ ∧ t′ ⊑ y ∧ t′ ⊑ t∧ y ⊑ t∧ l ⊑ k′ ∧ s′ ≡ t)
→ ∃lt (Pl ∧ Stdl ∧ y ⊑ t ∧ l ⊑ k′ ∧ s′ ≡ t)
By (Ax 19), the claim follows.
(iv) By (Ax 4) in the ﬁrst step and (Ax 10) in the second step, we have:
(*) ⊢ z ≡ y ∧ Stdl ∧ Syda ∧ s′ ≡ t ∧ a = l→ z ≡ y ∧ y = t ∧ s′ ≡ t
→ z ≡ s′
In addition, with (Ax 15) in the ﬁrst step and (Ax 12) in the second step, we have:
(**) ⊢ Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ Szdb ∧ z ≡ s′ → Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ b ⊑ z ∧ z ≡ s′
→ Ss′dg ∧ b ⊑ s′ ∧ Szdb ∧ z ≡ s′
From this, by Lemma 5(iii), we get:
⊢ Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ Szdb ∧ z ≡ s′ → b = g
(*) and (**) yield
(+) ⊢ z ≡ y ∧ Stdl ∧ Syda ∧ s′ ≡ t ∧ Ss′dg ∧ Szdb ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ a = l→ b = g
But by (Ax 2), we also have:
(++) ⊢ St′bg → b ̸= g
(+) and (++) imply the claim to be proved.
With this additional lemma now proved, we can go on to complete our proof of
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2, 2nd case:⊢ ∀abcu(a ̸= b∧Pa∧Pb∧Pc∧Subc→ ∃lw(Pl∧Swal∧u ≡ w))
Proof: Let α be the formula
Pa∧Pd∧¬Coll(abd)∧Syad∧Szbd∧x ≡ y∧x ≡ z∧Kkbc∧Pg∧Ss′dg∧ z ⊑ s′
∧ g ⊑ k∧St′bg∧u ≡ t′∧t′ ⊑ s′∧z ≡ y∧Kk′dg∧Pl∧Stdl∧y ⊑ t∧l ⊑ k′∧s′ ≡ t∧a ̸= l
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By Lemma 6(i) and 6(ii), we have:
⊢ Sxab∧Pa∧Pb∧Pc∧Subc→ ∃dyzk (Pd∧¬Coll(abd)∧Syad∧Szbd∧ x ≡ y
∧x ≡ z ∧Kkbc ∧ ∃gs′t′ (Pg ∧ Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ g ⊑ k ∧ St′bg ∧ u ≡ t′ ∧ t′ ⊑ s′))
Together with (Ax 3), (Ax 9), and (Ax 10), this implies:
⊢ Sxab∧Pa∧Pb∧Pc∧Subc→ ∃dyzk∃gs′t′(Pd∧¬Coll(abd)∧Syad∧Szbd∧x ≡ y
∧x ≡ z ∧Kkbc ∧ Pg ∧ Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ g ⊑ k ∧ St′bg ∧ u ≡ t′ ∧ t′ ⊑ s′ ∧ z ≡ y)
Therefore, by Lemma 6(iii) and 6(iv):
(+) ⊢ Sxab ∧ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ Subc → ∃dyzk ∃gs′t′ (Pd ∧ ¬Coll(abd) ∧ Syad ∧
Szbd ∧ x ≡ y ∧ x ≡ z ∧Kkbc ∧ Pg ∧ Ss′dg ∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ g ⊑ k ∧ St′bg ∧ u ≡ t′ ∧ t′ ⊑ s′
∧ z ≡ y ∧ ∃k′lt (Kk′dg ∧ Pl ∧ Stdl ∧ y ⊑ t ∧ l ⊑ k′ ∧ s′ ≡ t ∧ a ̸= l)))
→ ∃dyzkgs′t′k′lt α
From (Ax 5), we have:
(*) ⊢ α→ ∃w (Swal ∧ Pl ∧ Stdl ∧ Ss′dg ∧ s′ ≡ t ∧ Syda ∧ Szdb ∧ y ⊑ t ∧ z ⊑ s′
∧ y ≡ z ∧ St′bg ∧ u ≡ t′)
Furthermore, from (Ax 22), we have:
(**) ⊢ Stdl∧Ss′dg ∧ s′ ≡ t∧Syda∧Szdb∧ y ⊑ t∧ z ⊑ s′ ∧ y ≡ z ∧Swal∧St′bg
→ w ≡ t′
(*) and (**) entail, together with (Ax 9) and (Ax 10) in the second step:
⊢ α→ ∃w (Pl ∧ Swal ∧ w ≡ t′ ∧ u ≡ t′)
→ ∃lw (Pl ∧ Swal ∧ u ≡ w)
This and (+) imply
⊢ ∃x Sxab ∧ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ Subc→ ∃lw (Pl ∧ Swal ∧ u ≡ w)
With (Ax 5), the claim to be proven follows.
Without further ado, we turn to Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: ⊢ ∀ss′ (Ss ∧ Ss′ ∧ s′ < s→ ∃t (St ∧ t ⊑ s ∧ s′ ≡ t))
Proof: Let β be the formula
Sxad∧ x ≡ s′ ∧Kkad∧Pw ∧Staw ∧St′ ∧ t′ ⊑ t∧ t′ ⊑ s∧w ⊑ k ∧Ssab∧ s′ < s
By Proposition 2 and (Ax 1), we have:
⊢ Ssab ∧ Ss′uv ∧ s′ < s→ ∃dx (Sxad ∧ x ≡ s′)
From this, it follows by (Ax 19)
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(*) ⊢ Ssab ∧ Ss′ ∧ s′ < s→ ∃dxk (Sxad ∧ x ≡ s′ ∧Kkad)
Moreover, by (Ax 21.2)
(**) ⊢ Ssab ∧Kkad→ ∃wtt′ (Pw ∧ Staw ∧ St′ ∧ t′ ⊑ t ∧ t′ ⊑ s ∧ w ⊑ k)
From (*) and (**) we have:
(+) ⊢ Ssab ∧ Ss′ ∧ s′ < s→ ∃t∃dxkwt′ β
From Lemma 2, we have:
⊢ Kkad ∧ Sxad ∧ Staw ∧ w ⊑ k → x ≡ t
and also, by (Ax 9) and (Ax 10),
⊢ Kkad ∧ Sxad ∧ Staw ∧ w ⊑ k ∧ x ≡ s′ → s′ ≡ t
Thus
(++) ⊢ β → s′ ≡ t
Furthermore, using Lemma 4 in the ﬁrst step and (Ax 28) in the second,
⊢ Ssab ∧ Staw ∧ St′ ∧ t′ ⊑ t ∧ t′ ⊑ s ∧ t ≡ s′ ∧ s′ < s
→ Ssab ∧ Staw ∧ St′ ∧ t′ ⊑ t ∧ t′ ⊑ s ∧ t ≤ s
→ t ⊑ s
Hence
(+++) ⊢ β → t ⊑ s
(+), (++) and (+++) imply the claim to be proven.
3.5 Remark on propositions I.4–10
Wehave also worked out proofs of Propositions 4 through 6 and 8 through 10.10 Or rather,
we have (followingHilbert andmany others) adopted Propositions 4 and 8 as axioms, and
worked out proofs of the others. Proposition 4 says, roughly, that if two triangles have two
pairs of equal sides and the angle between the equal sides equal, then they are congruent.
Proposition 8 says that if two triangles have three pairs of equal sides, then the angles
contained by the pairs of equal sides are equal.
Proposition 5, the famous pons asinorum, whose ﬁrst proof is (somewhat implausibly)
attributed to Thales, says that isosceles triangles have their base angles (and exterior base
angles) equal. Proposition 6 states its converse.
Proposition 9 is “to cut a given straight angle in half”. Proposition 10 is “to cut a given
bounded straight line in half”. We have formalized them, like Propositions 1 through 3,
as ∀∃-sentences.
10 Proposition 7 is difficult to formalize and remains to be dealt with. One importance source of the
difficulty is the predicate ‘[point] …is on the other side of [line] …’
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For reasons of space, we cannot include our presentation of these proofs here, but, to
give the reader at least a rough sense of how we have proceeded, we describe brieﬂy here
the predicates and axioms we introduced.
The propositions in question (starting already with Proposition 4) use the concept of
an angle and they speak of angles being equal to or less than one another. The treatment
of angles has proved particularly challenging. We have extended L[E] by corresponding
six-place predicates, ‘bca≡˜def ’ (read ‘the angle at point a determined by segments ab and
ac is equal to the angle at point d determined by line segments de and df ′′) and ‘bca<˜def ’
(read ‘the angle at point a determined by segments ab and ac is less than or equal to the
angle at point d determined by line segments de and df ′′).
These predicates are governed by the following axioms:
(Ax 29) ∀abca′b′c′ (bca≡˜a′b′c′ → Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ Pa′ ∧ Pb′ ∧ Pc′)
(Ax 30) ∀abc (Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc→ bca≡˜abc)
(Ax 31) ∀abc (Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc→ bca≡˜acb)
(Ax 32) ∀abca′b′c′a′′b′′c′′ (bca≡˜a′b′c′ ∧ b′c′a′≡˜a′′b′′c′′ → bca≡˜a′′b′′c′′)
(Ax 33) ∀abca′b′c′ (bca<˜a′b′c′ → Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ Pa′ ∧ Pb′ ∧ Pc′)
(Ax 34) ∀abcdefss′tt′uu′ (¬Coll(abc)∧¬Coll(def)∧Ssab∧Ss′de∧ s ≡ s′
∧ Stac ∧ St′df ∧ t ≡ t′ ∧ bca≡˜def ∧ Subc ∧ Su′ef → u ≡ u′)
4 Systematic summary and reﬁnement of the logical system
We have formulated a ﬁrst-order language L[E] and developed in it a certain Theory of
Euclidean Geometry, EG. We have derived some propositions of this theory. Thus far, the
vocabulary of this language contains only the following non-logical signs:
the one-place predicate: ‘P ’
the two-place predicates: ‘≡’, ‘⊑’
the three-place predicate: ‘S’
the four-place predicate: ‘∆’
the six-place predicates: ‘≡￿’, ‘<￿’
Alongside the usual axioms and rules of classical ﬁrst-order predicate logic with identity,
we stipulated 36 axioms. We have here stated and proved Propositions 1 through 3. In
other work, we have also stated propositions 4 through 6 and 8 through 10, assuming
propositions 4 and 8 as axioms and proving the others.
This shows that L[E] and EG are sufficient for a detailed presentation of the Elements
through Proposition 10 (except for Proposition 7). But it will be obvious to any reader of
the Elements that further axioms are necessary for later parts of the work (e.g., the theory
of ratio in Book V, the theory of number in Books VII through IX, the three-dimensional
geometry of Book XI). It is to be expected that more axioms will be needed even for the
remainder of Book I and for the other elementary books on plane geometry without ratios
(II through IV). Both L[E] and EG are here preliminary. Both the language and the theory
will need to be checked and perhaps altered.
At the same time, it is conspicuous how many axioms are already necessary for EG.
Moreover, some of them are fairly complicated formulas. Could we not simplify some-
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what? This can be broken down into three more speciﬁc question. (1) Can some axioms
be eliminated by deriving them from others? (2) Can some primitive predicates be deﬁned
in terms of others? (3) Could we replace some axioms with other, preferable axioms? We
now go on to address these questions in two subsections.
4.1 Elimination of axioms by derivation
Are there axioms that we can eliminate by deriving them from others? – The answer is yes.
Here is an example, whichmight be somewhat surprising: (Ax 3) and (Ax 4) are derivable.
Lemma 7: (i) (Ax 13, 15, 16) ⊢ (Ax 4)
(ii) (Ax 1, 2, 5, 13, 15, 16) ⊢ (Ax 3)
Proof: (i) From (Ax 16), we have:
(Ax 16) ⊢ Ssxy ∧ Ss′xy ∧ x ⊑ s ∧ y ⊑ s→ s′ ⊑ s
From this follows, by (Ax 15):
(Ax 15, 16) ⊢ Ssxy ∧ Ss′xy → s′ ⊑ s
By interchanging s and s′, we also have:
(Ax 15, 16) ⊢ Ss′xy ∧ Ssxy → s ⊑ s′
The claim to be proven follows from these two sentences and (Ax 13).
(ii) Analogously to the proof of (i), we can show:
(Ax 13, 15, 16) ⊢ Ssyx ∧ Ss′xy → s′ = s
But this is equivalent to:
(*) (Ax 13, 15, 16) ⊢ Ssyx→ ∀s′ (Ss′xy → s′ = s)
From (Ax 1), (Ax 2), and (Ax 5), we get:
(**) (Ax 1, 2, 5) ⊢ Ssyx→ Px ∧ Py ∧ x ̸= y
→ ∃t Stxy
(*) and (**) imply:
(Ax 1, 2, 5, 13, 15, 16) ⊢ Ssyx→ ∃t (Stxy ∧ t = s)
→ Ssxy
4.2 Elimination of axioms by new axioms and deﬁnitions
Is it possible to deﬁne some of our primitive predicates in terms of others? In what follows,
we will consider two examples: a deﬁnition of ‘∆’ and a deﬁnition of ‘K’ in terms of
our other primitive predicates. These deﬁnitions not only fulﬁll their job from a proof-
theoretic perspective but are also plausible in light of the intended reading of ‘∆’ and ‘K’.
We use them in the ﬁnal sections of our paper.
726 Jonathan Beere et al.
We will ﬁrst consider the prospects for a deﬁnition of ‘∆’. To this end, let us consider
the language L[E−], which is L[E] without the predicates ‘∆’ and ‘K’.
In order to use the followingmereological deﬁnition of ‘∆’, we will need to strengthen
the mereological axioms of EG. To begin with, we will deﬁne points, just as the ﬁrst
deﬁnition of the Elements does, as objects having no (proper) parts.
Deﬁnition: Px :↔ ∀y (y ⊑ x→ y = x)
For another thing, we will require a fusion scheme for the language L[E−].
(Ax FUS) Let ψ be a formula of L[E−]; then the universal closure of the follow-
ing formula is an axiom (an instance of the fusion scheme):
∃x ψ→ ∃y∀u (Pu→ (u ⊑ y ↔ ∃x (ψ ∧ u ⊑ x)))
The intuitive basis for the deﬁnition of ‘∆’ is this: if a triangle T is determined by
three non-collinear points,A,B, and C, andAB andAC are sides of T , and the pointX
is onAB and the point Y is onAC, thenX and Y are parts of T and everything between
X and Y is also part of T . Conversely, if T is a triangle determined by the non-collinear
pointsA,B, and C, and P is a point that is part of T , then there is a straight line through
P that intersects two sides of T .
Thus we deﬁne ‘∆’ as follows:
Deﬁnitions: Zuab :↔ Pu ∧ ∃s (Ssab ∧ u ⊑ s)
∆yabc :↔ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ ¬Coll(abc)∧
∀u (Pu→ (u ⊑ y ↔ ∃xvw (Zvab∧Zwac∧Sxvw∧u ⊑ x)))
It is obvious that these deﬁnientia are expressed in L[E−]. Using these deﬁnitions, the next
lemma can be shown:
Lemma 8: (i) ⊢ (Ax 17)
(ii) (Ax 5, 14, 15, FUS) ⊢ (Ax 18)
Proof: (i) By deﬁnition.
(ii) Let ψ be the L[E−] formula
∃vw (Zvab ∧ Zwac ∧ Sxvw).
By Lemma 1 and (Ax 15) in the ﬁrst step, we have:
(Ax 5, 14, 15) ⊢ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ ¬Coll(abc)
→ Pa ∧ ∃s (Ssab ∧ a ⊑ s) ∧ Pc ∧ ∃s′ (Ss′ac ∧ c ⊑ s′) ∧ ∃x Sxac
→ ∃x (Zaab ∧ Zcac ∧ Sxac)
→ ∃x∃vw (Zvab ∧ Zwac ∧ Sxvw)
→ ∃x ψ
By (Ax FUS), it then follows that
Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ ¬Coll(abc)
→ ∃y∀u (Pu→ (u ⊑ y ↔ ∃x (∃vw (Zvab ∧ Zwac ∧ Sxvw) ∧ u ⊑ x)))
is derivable in (Ax 5), (Ax 14), (Ax 15), (Ax FUS). Therefore, with the deﬁnition of ‘∆’ in
the second step:
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(Ax 5, 14, 15, FUS) ⊢ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ ¬Coll(abc)→ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Pc ∧ ¬Coll(abc) ∧
∃y∀u (Pu→ (u ⊑ y ↔ ∃xvw (Zvab ∧ Zwac ∧ Sxvw ∧ u ⊑ x)))
→ ∃y ∆yabc
With circles, there is a similar situation. Like ‘∆’, ‘K’ can be deﬁned in such a way that
the relevant axiom (Ax 19) can bemereologically derived.Moreover, the revised deﬁnition
can also be used to prove all the results we have proved. Thus, let us deﬁne ‘K’ using only
expressions which belong to L[E−].
Deﬁnition: Kyab :↔ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ a ̸= b∧
∀u (Pu→ (u ⊑ y ↔ ∃st (Ssab ∧ Stau ∧ s ≡ t)))
Lemma 9: (i) (Ax 5, 8) ⊢ ∀xyz (Kxyz → z ⊑ x)
(ii) (Ax 2) ⊢ ∀xyz (Kxyz → ∀w (Pw ∧ w ⊑ x→ y ̸= w))
(iii) (Ax 4) ⊢ ∀xyz (Kxyz → ∀wss′ (Pw ∧ w ⊑ x ∧ Ssyz ∧ Ss′yw → s ≡ s′))
Proof: (i) By (Ax 5) and (Ax 8), we have:
(Ax 5, 8) ⊢ Py ∧ Pz ∧ y ̸= z → ∃s (Ssyz ∧ Ssyz ∧ s ≡ s)
→ ∃st (Ssyz ∧ Styz ∧ s ≡ t)
By the deﬁnition of ‘K’, it follows:
(Ax 5, 8) ⊢ Kxyz
→ Pz∧∀u(Pu→ (u ⊑ x↔ ∃st(Ssyz∧Styu∧s ≡ t)))∧∃st(Ssyz∧Styz∧s ≡ t)
→ (z ⊑ x↔ ∃st (Ssyz ∧ Styz ∧ s ≡ t)) ∧ ∃st (Ssyz ∧ Styz ∧ s ≡ t)
→ z ⊑ x
(ii) By the deﬁnition of ‘K’ and with (Ax 2) in the second step, we have:
(Ax 2) ⊢ Kxyz ∧ Pw ∧ w ⊑ x→ ∃st (Ssyz ∧ Styw ∧ s ≡ t)
→ y ̸= w
This implies the claim sought.
(iii) By the deﬁnition of ‘K’ and with (Ax 4) in the second step, we have:
(Ax 4) ⊢ Kxyz ∧ Pw ∧ w ⊑ x ∧ Ssyz ∧ Ss′yw
→ ∃uv (Suyz ∧ Svyw ∧ u ≡ v ∧ Ssyz ∧ Ss′yw)
→ ∃uv (u = s ∧ v = s′ ∧ u ≡ v)
→ s ≡ s′
This implies the claim to be proven.
Lemma 10: (Ax 8, FUS) ⊢ (Ax 19)
Proof: Let ψ be the L[E−] formula
∃st (Ssab ∧ Stax ∧ s ≡ t ∧ Px).
Then:
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⊢ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Ssab ∧ Ssab ∧ s ≡ s ∧ Pb→ ∃st (Ssab ∧ Stab ∧ s ≡ t ∧ Pb)
→ ∃x∃st (Ssab ∧ Stax ∧ s ≡ t ∧ Px)
→ ∃x ψ
Hence it follows by (Ax 8) and (Ax FUS):
(Ax 8, FUS) ⊢ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Ssab
→ ∃y∀u (Pu→ (u ⊑ y ↔ ∃x (∃st (Ssab∧ Stax∧ s ≡ t∧Px)∧ u ⊑ x)))
Therefore, employing the deﬁnition of ‘Px’ in the second step:
(Ax 8, FUS) ⊢ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Ssab
→ ∃y∀u (Pu→ (u ⊑ y ↔ ∃st (Ssab∧ s ≡ t∧ ∃x (Stax∧Px∧ u ⊑ x))))
→ ∃y∀u (Pu→ (u ⊑ y ↔ ∃st (Ssab∧ s ≡ t∧ ∃x (Stax∧Px∧ u = x))))
→ ∃y∀u (Pu→ (u ⊑ y ↔ ∃st (Ssab ∧ s ≡ t ∧ Stau)))
It follows that:
(Ax 8, FUS) ⊢ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Ssab
→ Pa ∧ Pb ∧ Ssab ∧ ∃y∀u (Pu→ (u ⊑ y ↔ ∃st (Ssab ∧ Stau ∧ s ≡ t)))
→ ∃y Kyab.
5 Mereogeometry
What sort of a theory is EG? On the intended interpretation of L[E], ‘⊑’ is clearly mereo-
logical vocabulary. We would probably classify the other primitive predicates as geomet-
ric. These predicates are certainly often found in texts on geometry. Thus EG is a theory
that contains both geometric and mereological vocabulary and moreover connects the
geometric and mereological terms. On analogy with the now popular term ‘mereotopol-
ogy’ (for the combination of mereological and topological principles), we suggest calling
such a theory a mereogeometry. EG would be a mereogeometrical theory.
We admit that the term ‘mereogeometry’ is only as clear as the terms ‘mereological
theory’ and ‘geometrical theory’. And it is not clear how to explicate those predicates.
It should not depend on the notation of the formal language. The decisive matter is the
intended interpretation of the vocabulary and the axioms that govern its use in the theory.
But these two factors (interpretation and axioms) do not yield entirely clear criteria for
distinguishing mereological and geometric theories.
Moreover, even if it is prima facie clear that a predicate belongs to the geometric and not
to the mereological vocabulary, this might not be true of a reconstruction or explication
of that predicate. One example of this is Euclid’s own deﬁnition of ‘point’ as ‘that which
has no part’ (I, def. 1). This deﬁniens contains only mereological vocabulary.
5.1 Can the mereological vocabulary of EG be eliminated?
Ourmain concern, however, is whether the mereological content of our theory EGmight
be eliminated by deﬁning the mereological term in purely geometric terms. This would
show that our theory is, in a sense, not ‘essentially’ mereological.
One might attempt to deﬁne ‘⊑’ in terms of the geometric predicates of L[E], but
we do not see any way to do this. Alternatively, one might introduce a further primitive
two-place predicate, I, to be read ‘…intersects …’ (We will use the term such that a point
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that lies on a line intersects that line, and the line intersects the point.) Then ‘⊑’ can be
removed from the primitive vocabulary of L[E] and deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition: x ⊑ y :↔ ∀z (xIz → yIz)
(Ax 11) and (Ax 12) are then consequences of this deﬁnition and become theorems.
(Ax 15), however, is still required. (It can be reformulated in terms of ‘I’.)
Is the predicate ‘I’ a geometric one or itself mereological? In light of the considerations
given just above, this question resolves itself into two other questions: (1) Is ‘intersects’ a
geometric or a mereological predicate? (2) Are the axioms for ‘I’ best interpreted geomet-
rically or mereologically? Neither question seems answerable. The ﬁrst is not answerable,
because our linguistic intuitions do not even yield the intuition that the one or other
answer is wrong. The second is not answerable because, except for (Ax 15), we need
no axioms for ‘I’ and (Ax 15) seems to be neither distinctively geometric nor distinc-
tively mereological. In particular, one might interpret ‘I’ also as ‘overlap’, which poses
no problem for (Ax 15), and ‘overlap’ is generally taken to be paradigmatic mereological
vocabulary.
In short, there seems no reason to think that the mereological vocabulary of theory
EG could be deﬁned in purely geometric terms and thereby eliminated.
5.2 Extended geometric objects
Extended objects, such as triangles and circles (but also straight lines), present another
problem for the distinction between mereological and geometric vocabulary. Such ex-
tended objects might be construed as being composed of points. But we would then
expect that the predicates that refer to them do not belong to purely geometric vocabulary.
This requires some explanation.
A straight line, s, is determined by two endpoints, a and b. But s is distinct from a
and from b. Analogously, a triangle t is determined by three points or by three straight
lines, but it is distinct from each of the three points and from each of the straight lines.
Likewise, a circle is determined by two points, the center and any arbitrary point on its
circumference, but it is distinct from each of these points.
Thus one might take the straight line from a to b to be the set of all points that are
collinear with a and b and between them. Or to be simply the ordered pair (a, b). Or to be
the two-member set {a, b}. And the triangle with vertices a, b, and cmight be the ordered
triple (a,b,c) or some other set-theoretic construct involving a, b, and c. Finally, it would
be natural to take a circle k around a through b to be the set of points which have the
same distance from a as b. But these are set-theoretic deﬁnitions and constructions, which
contemporary mathematics is accustomed to use, but Euclid did not think in this way. As
interpreters of Euclid and as logicians who are attempting (for the moment) to avoid set
theory, neither should we.
Intuitively, if a triangle or a circle or straight line is any kind of construction out of
points, then it is not a set, but rather a mereological fusion. That is, it is a whole that has
the relevant points as parts.
Moreover, we need to address the question whether circles, triangles, etc. include
only their boundary points or also their interior points? For Euclid, the interior points of
circles, triangles, etc. belong to those ﬁgures. Indeed, he deﬁnes ﬁgure (or shape; σχῆμα)
as “what is contained [περιεχόμενον] by some boundary or boundaries [ὅρων]” (I, def.
4). The ﬁgure is not the boundary, but that which is contained by the boundary. This
conception is reiterated then in the deﬁnitions of the various ﬁgures, each of which is
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deﬁned as that which is contained by a certain sort of boundary (see Book I, defs. 15, 18,
and 19).
While we spoke from time to time as if triangles and circles were to be identiﬁed with
their boundaries, this is a mere matter of terminology. ‘∆’ can be interpreted either as the
predicate ‘…is a triangle [Euclidean ﬁgure] determined by…,…, and…’ or as the predicate
‘…is the perimeter of a triangle determined by …, …, and …’ With either interpretation,
our existence axiom (Ax 18) will come out true. Something similar is true for ‘K’, but it
is just slightly more complicated. As far as our existence axiom (Ax 19) is concerned, ‘K’
might just as well be the predicate ‘…is a circle [Euclidean ﬁgure] around …through …’
However, our deﬁnition of ‘K’ rules this out and is compatible onlywith interpreting ‘K’ as
a circumference predicate. This, however, is easily avoided. The deﬁnition of ‘K’ could be
reformulated as a deﬁnition of another predicate, say ‘Kˇ’, so that ‘K’ is a predicate for circles
(Euclidean ﬁgures with interiors) whereas ‘Kˇ’ is a predicate for a circle’s circumference.
One might also consider giving no deﬁnition at all for ‘K’. The use of the predicate
would then have to be governed entirely by axioms. An obvious way to do this would to
addLemma 9 (i), (ii) and (iii) (alongwith (Ax 19)). As already noted, all of the propositions
proved here could be proven on this basis.
In this case, neither ‘∆’ nor ‘K’ would be deﬁned using mereological vocabulary.
Triangles and circles would thus not have been introduced as mereological fusions. Other
axioms could entail that they are mereological fusions, but not the axioms of EG. Even if
circles and triangles are in fact fusions (of points, say), our theory would simply ignore
this fact.
However, none of this would signiﬁcantly affect the role of mereology in EG. For
the existence axioms for triangles and circles (and also Lemma 9 (i), (ii), and (iii), which
would become axioms on this scenario) use mereological vocabulary. Mereology and
mereogeometry are thus used whenever these axioms are used, even if we refrain from
deﬁning ‘∆’ and ‘K’.
5.3 On the usefulness of mereogeometry
How is mereogeometry useful and interesting? Here we should distinguish between a
number of related questions.
First, does Euclid’s Elements present a mereogeomtry? Our consideration both of Book
II and of Book I, Propositions 1 through 10 (without 7) gives strong evidence that the
answer is yes. This will not be a great surprise to interpreters of Euclid. Our contribution
has two aspects. We have showed how, in connection with Book II, it is mereological
concepts (part, whole, composition, dissection) that play the role wemight have expected
quantitative operations (addition and subtraction of real numbers) to play. This concerns
not merely the question whether mereology plays a role, but what role it plays. Also,
we have showed carefully and speciﬁcally how, without relying on diagrams, mereology
enters the initial propositions of Book I.
Second, is it possible to formulate a geometric theory in a ﬁrst-order logical language,
which contains neither set-theoretic nor mereological vocabulary, and only predicates
that apply to n-tuples of points? Here, again, the answer is yes. This has been known
since Tarskis investigations of the foundations of geometry in the middle of the 20th
century.11 In particular, Tarski speciﬁed a language without predicates that express ‘…is
a straight line’, ‘…is a triangle’, or ‘…is a circle’. It is, however, also not clear how these
predicates might be deﬁned within Tarski’s framework. The familiar way of speaking
11 See Schwabhäuser, Szmielew, and Tarski 1983.
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about geometric ﬁgures must be replaced, within Tarski’s framework, by talk about n-
tuples of points (e.g., a triangle is treated as a triple of non-collinear points).
Third, supposing that one wants to speak of extended geometric objects (by contrast
with n-tuples of points), how should one do this? It is something that we wish to do,
as we explained in the Introduction, partly as an interpretation of Euclid, partly for its
intrinsic philosophical interest. There seem two main approaches. Either the relevant
predicates are introduced via deﬁnitions or their use is governed by axioms. In the ﬁrst
case, it would be natural to use mereological vocabulary in the deﬁnientia. This seems to
us the preferable approach. This is not because we consider deﬁnitions to be superior to
axioms. (It is not at all clear that the approach reduces the total number of axioms, for
axioms are also needed to govern the mereological primitives.) Rather, we have used a
generally accepted mereological fusion schema. In section 4.3, we saw how we can use
this axiom (together with Atomism, which in any case ﬁts well with the geometry of EG)
to derive (Ax 18) and (Ax 19). Thus the advantage of this approach is the way it enables
us to avoid postulating highly speciﬁc geometric axioms. This approach seems to us well
worth developing, because we think (with Euclid?) that we ordinarily speak of extended
objects. And we think that such a logic can contribute to clarifying both Euclid’s theory
and the systematic philosophical questions about how to understand extended objects.
5.4 The way forward
This paper is contains signiﬁcant results and they invite further research. First, and per-
haps most obviously, we should complete our formalization of Euclid Books I and II. (It
would also be desirable to consider whether the axioms that are sufficient for Books I
and II are also sufficient for III and IV. This seems likely, but it is not entirely obvious.)
This would be a sort of commentary on the relevant parts of the Elements. As noted, it
seems to us important to have such a logical treatment of the Elements that does not use
the diagrams for drawing inferences. Second, our approach to geometry should be com-
pared in details with Tarski’s. Most signiﬁcantly, can a logical language of extended objects
(by contrast with n-tuples of points) be developed using mereology that has essentially
greater expressive power? Third, we would like to reﬁne our approach by reconsidering
the concept of a boundary and its relation to the concept of a part. We have treated points
as parts of lines and lines as parts of ﬁgures. It is not so clear that Euclid does this. In
Section 2, we found Euclid treating ﬁgures as parts of ﬁgures. It is likely that Euclid, in
fact, thinks that only objects of same kind can stand in the part-whole relation.12 This
would require us to extend L[E] by at least one additional predicate. It would also bring
our work into connection with recent mereotopology,13 from which we would hope to
beneﬁt, and to which we would hope to make a contribution. In particular, Euclid’s
theory seems to be one with points (which have no parts) but without atoms (because
lines are not composed of points, nor ﬁgures of lines). Aristotle also espoused such a
theory. But current philosophers and logicians, although they are interested in geometries
without atoms, have not, to our knowledge, considered such theories.
12 One might think that ‘of the same kind’ means simply ‘with the same number of dimensions’, but this
is probably too quick. An angle cannot be part of a ﬁgure, but an angle seems to be a two-dimensional
object. Having the same number of dimensions is probably a necessary, but not sufficient, condition on
standing in the part-whole relation.
13 E.g., Glibowski 1969; Simons 1987; Smith 1997; Casati and Varzi 1999.
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